



WHY DO PEOPLE AVOID INFORMATION ABOUT PRIVACY? 
 DAN SVIRSKY† 
Why do people keep their head in the sand when making data sharing 
decisions? There is a widespread intuition, supported by copious 
research, that people are inconsistent in their behavior around internet 
privacy. Anger about privacy scandals dominates newspaper headlines, 
but most people don’t change their default privacy settings, even when 
it’s easy to do so. New evidence confirms that this inconsistency is real, 
and that information avoidance helps drive the inconsistency. This 
raises a new question: how does information avoidance work? This 
paper presents a new experimental design to start unpacking how 
information avoidance operates. There are two main results. First, the 
experiment replicates existing information avoidance experiments: 
people who value privacy are willing to deal away their data for small 
money amounts if given a chance to avoid seeing the privacy 
consequences of their actions. Second, the experiment shows that while 
people are comfortable avoiding information about privacy in a passive 
way, they are not comfortable actively hiding it. These results show that 
people’s ability to keep their head in the sand is fragile: it is a 
preference people are not willing to exercise conspicuously. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Why do people keep their head in the sand when making data sharing 
decisions? 
There is a widespread intuition, supported by copious research, that 
people are inconsistent in their behavior around internet privacy.1 Anger 
about privacy scandals dominates newspaper headlines, but most people 
don’t change their weak, default privacy settings, even when it’s easy 
to do so.2 
New evidence confirms that this inconsistency is real, and that 
information avoidance helps drive the inconsistency.3 Using an 
 
1 See Alessandro Acquisti et al., Privacy and Human Behavior in the Age of Information, 
347 SCI. 509, 510 (2015) (explaining the widespread discrepancies between online privacy 
attitudes and behaviors); Susan Athey et al., The Digital Privacy Paradox: Small Money, Small 
Costs, Small Talk 17-18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23488, 2017) 
(“Consumers say they care about privacy, but at multiple points in the process end up making 
choices that are inconsistent with their stated preferences.”).  
2 See, e.g., Kevin Lewis et al., The Taste for Privacy: An Analysis of College Student Privacy 
Settings in an Online Social Network, 14 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 79, 95 (2008) 
(finding that only one third of college students using Facebook changed their default privacy 
settings); Ralph Gross & Alessandro Acquisti, Information Revelation and Privacy in Online 
Social Networks, 2005 ACM WORKSHOP ON PRIVACY IN THE ELEC. SOC’Y 71, 78 (2005) (“We 
can conclude that only a vanishingly small number of users change the (permissive) default 
privacy preferences.”). 
3 See Dan Svirsky, Why Are Privacy Preferences Inconsistent? 24 (JOHN M. OLIN CTR. FOR 
LAW, ECON., & BUS. FELLOWS’ DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, HARV. LAW SCH., Discussion 
Paper No. 81, 2018) (“This paper presents an experiment that adds to the literature documenting 
inconsistencies in people’s privacy preferences.”). 
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experimental design adopted from research on altruism,4 this research 
finds that people are willing to give up nearly an hour’s worth of wages 
to keep their Facebook data private.5 At the same time, participants in a 
treatment group are also willing to trade their data for 52 cents if given 
a chance to avoid seeing the privacy implications of their choice.6 
Hence, information avoidance behavior can recreate, in a controlled 
experimental setting, the pattern of behavior commonly seen in field 
settings where people are inconsistent about privacy. 
This raises a new question: why does information avoidance with 
respect to privacy online happen?  
While the experiment gives strong evidence that people avoid 
(nearly) costless information about privacy, there are multiple ways to 
understand this behavior. One possibility is that thinking about losing 
privacy is inherently unpleasant. There are many topics outside of 
internet privacy that are inherently upsetting to consider, like 
cockroaches, death, and one’s own moral failings.7 Avoidance thus 
reduces the time to consider those unpleasant facets of life. For example, 
many people eat at restaurants without looking at public health 
inspection reports on vermin in kitchens. Privacy might be like that.  
Another possibility is that even when people know that they should 
care about privacy, they don’t really care.8 Evidence from altruism 
experiments, for example, demonstrate that people will give money to a 
Salvation Army volunteer ringing a bell at a supermarket entrance, but 
 
4 See Jason Dana et al., Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room: Experiments Demonstrating an 
Illusory Preference for Fairness, 33 ECON. THEORY 67, 70-74 (2007) (describing experimental 
design of a modified dictator game to test wealth allocation); Zachary Grossman & Joel J. van 
der Weele, Self-Image and Willful Ignorance in Social Decisions, 15 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 173, 
197-206 (2017) (“[analyzing] a Bayesian signaling model of an agent who cares about self-
image and has the opportunity to learn the social benefits of a personally costly action”); Lauren 
Feiler, Testing Models of Information Avoidance with Binary Choice Dictator Games, 45 J. 
ECON. PSYCHOL. 253, 256-260 (2014) (extending the moral wiggle room experimental design 
by manipulating the probabilities of different money payoffs). This paper extends the moral 
wiggle room experimental design in the privacy space in a similar way to the Grossman & van 
der Weele paper, which also tests the effects of differing the default amount of information 
presented, albeit in the social preferences space. 
5 See Svirsky, supra note 3, at 14 (“[F]or these participants, sharing their Facebook profile 
entails a privacy cost equal to roughly one hour of labor.”). 
6 See id. (finding that nearly a third of participants chose to share their Facebook profile for 
50 cents). 
7 See Russell Golman et al., Information Avoidance, 55 J. ECON. LIT. 96, 106-07 (2017) 
(explaining the use of information avoidance as a defense against disappointment). 
8 Cf. Christine Exley, Excusing Selfishness in Charitable Giving: The Role of Risk, 83 REV. 
ECON. STUDIES 587 (2016) (demonstrating how participants use risk as an excuse to avoid 
donating money); Dana et al., supra note 4 (showing how people exploit wiggle room to avoid 
behaving altruistically). 
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people will also avoid that entrance if there are multiple ways to enter 
the store.9 Perhaps in both this domain and privacy, people simply want 
to seem like the type of person who values an important social good 
(altruism, data security, privacy).10  
Another alternative is that making a tradeoff between money and 
privacy is difficult, and people are happy to avoid undergoing this 
psychic cost.11 If someone is offered a cup of coffee for $0.25, or for 
$5.00, she can tell that the first price is somewhat low and the second 
price somewhat high. The same might not be true for sharing data. 
Yet another alternative is that all these explanations hold, to different 
degrees and with different interaction effects, depending on the person 
and the context. Perhaps someone wants to seem like she cares about 
privacy, doesn’t like thinking about it, and has no real idea what a fair 
price for data is. All these mechanisms can push her to avoid 
information. For one person, the first mechanism might dominate. For 
the same person, the third mechanism might dominate for certain types 
of data.  
This paper presents a new experimental design to start exploring 
these questions in two steps. First, it replicates the initial two-group 
experiment on information avoidance in privacy, and second, it adds a 
third group which has an active choice about hiding information. In the 
design, participants make decisions about the privacy settings and 
potential money bonuses for a survey they must complete. They can 
either complete the survey anonymously or after sharing their public 
Facebook profile with the survey-taker. Different money bonuses can 
attach to different privacy settings.  
 
9 See James Andreoni et al., Avoiding the Ask: A Field Experiment on Altruism, Empathy, 
and Charitable Giving, 125 J. POL. ECON. 625, 628 (2017) (“When avoidance was easy because 
only one door had a solicitor, nearly one-third of those intending to pass through the occupied 
door instead chose to use an unoccupied entrance.”). See also Edward Lazear et al., Sorting in 
Experiments with Application to Social Preferences, 4 AM. ECON. J: APPLIED ECON. 136, 136 
(2012) (“[A]llowing subjects to avoid environments in which sharing is possible significantly 
reduces sharing.”); Stefano DellaVigna et al., Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in 
Charitable Giving, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1, 1 (2012) (finding that individuals who knew when 
fundraiser solicitations would arrive at their homes were more likely to avoid the giving 
scenario). 
10 See Christine Exley & Judd Kessler, Motivated Errors 1-2 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working 
Paper, No. 18-017, 2017) (finding that individuals motivated to act in their own self-interest 
display behavioral biases yet act more rational when these self-serving motivations are 
removed). 
11 See Cass Sunstein, Choosing Not to Choose, 64 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (2014) (“In part because 
of limitations of [cognitive resources,] and in part because of awareness of their own lack of 
information and potential biases, people sometimes want other people to choose for them.”). 
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There are three experimental groups: a direct tradeoff group, a veiled 
tradeoff group, and a choice tradeoff group. Importantly, there is no real 
difference in the choices the three groups make. In all three cases, 
participants decide whether to share their Facebook data for 52 cents, a 
decision participants can be made aware of if presented the option to 
view privacy settings. For the direct tradeoff group, privacy settings on 
data sharing are hidden by default; for the veiled tradeoff group, privacy 
settings are visible by default but can be actively hidden; and for the 
choice tradeoff group, privacy settings are visible by default but can be 
hidden or randomized. 
There are three main results. First, the findings replicate the original 
information avoidance experiment: the direct tradeoff group chose 
privacy 70% of the time, while the veiled tradeoff group chose privacy 
40% of the time. Second, the findings for the choice tradeoff group are 
directly in between the direct and veiled groups: participants choose 
privacy 56% of the time. Third, I find that participants in the choice 
tradeoff group very rarely made the active choice to hide information: 
they clicked the button to hide privacy settings only 9% of the time, 
whereas the veiled tradeoff group accepted the default of keeping 
privacy settings hidden 44% of the time.  
Taken together, these results shed light on how information 
avoidance works. People are comfortable avoiding information about 
privacy, but they are not comfortable actively hiding it. Strangely, even 
the option of actively hiding makes people less likely to choose privacy. 
Section I of the paper discusses current privacy law in the United 
States as well as the literature on privacy inconsistency and what causes 
it. Section II unpacks different mechanisms that can drive information 
avoidance. Section III details the experimental design. Section IV 
presents the results of the experiment. Section V concludes. 
I. PEOPLE’S PRIVACY PREFERENCES ARE INCONSISTENT, AND 
INFORMATION AVOIDANCE CAN EXPLAIN THIS INCONSISTENCY  
A. Privacy Preferences are Inconsistent 
Extensive experiments and surveys document that people say they 
value privacy but also give up their data for small amounts of money or 
convenience.12 For example, people claim to care greatly about protecting 
 
12 Athey et al., supra note 1, at 2 (“Whereas people say they care about privacy, they are 
willing to relinquish private data quite easily when incentivized to do so.”); Leslie John et al., 
Strangers on a Plane: Context-Dependent Willingness to Divulge Sensitive Information, 37 J. 
CONS. RES. 858, 858 (2011) (“[D]isclosure of private information is responsive to environmental 
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their data, yet are much less likely to choose a privacy-preserving option 
if it is listed second on a menu instead of first.13 Even privacy disclosures 
that are strikingly clear and scary have limited impact on how much data 
people give away.14 
These empirical findings have legal importance because privacy law in 
the United States relies on a Notice and Choice framework.15 Firms in the 
United States can legally harvest data from consumers so long as 
consumers receive proper notice and agree to the exchange. This approach 
was first outlined in a 1973 report by the U.S. Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare.16 The reliance on notice and voluntary consent 
was a departure from how privacy law originally developed. Before the 
rise in internet commerce and telecommunications, privacy concerns in 
transactions between non-state actors were governed by tort law.17 As 
internet transactions have come to dominate private data, contract law 
principles have come to increasingly govern privacy law.18 Since privacy 
is governed by consumer choice, the well-documented fickleness in how 
consumers make privacy decisions has policy importance.   
There are exceptions to the Notice and Choice framework. Banks send 
annual privacy notices because of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.19 Doctors 
require patients to sign an extra form because of the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act.20 Websites ask users if they are older 
 
cues that bear little connection . . . to objective [privacy] hazards.”). See, e.g., Alessandro 
Acquisti et al., What is Privacy Worth, 42 J.L. STUD. 249, 268-69 (2013) (discussing how 
individuals make inconsistent decisions in privacy contexts in part because of default privacy 
settings). Cf. Adam Chilton & Omri Ben-Shahar, Simplification of Privacy Disclosures: An 
Experimental Test 566 (Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics, No. 737, 
2016) (describing the failure of simplified privacy disclosures to effect meaningful change in 
participants’ behavior in disclosing private information). 
13 Athey et al., supra note 1, at 12 (“[W]hen wallets that would maximize privacy from the 
public are not listed first, students are 13% less likely to select them . . . .”). 
14 Chilton & Ben-Shahar, supra note 12, at 541 (“[B]est-practice simplification techniques 
have little to no effect on respondents’ comprehension of the disclosure, willingness to share 
personal information, and expectations about their rights.”). 
15 See generally Chilton & Ben-Shahar, supra note 12, at 572-73 (discussing the emphasis 
in American privacy law on giving proper notice to consumers). 
16 Records Computers and the Rights of Citizens, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND 
WELFARE, SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS, xxx-xxxii (1973).   
17 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 410 (1978) 
(discussing the general features of tort-based commercial privacy law); William L. Prosser, 
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (highlighting the four types of privacy torts). Cf. 
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890) 
(articulating the need for common law to grow to cover an individual’s right ‘to be let alone’ 
and provide a remedy for invasions of privacy by the press”). 
18 There is more stringent regulation of certain consumers and certain industries.  
19 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801(b), 6805(b)(2) (2000).   
20 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(2) (2000). 
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than 13 -- not 18, not 12, not 16 -- because of the Childrens Online Privacy 
Protection Act.21 Outside the United States, there is even more stringent 
regulation. The European Union has started enforcing the General Data 
Protection Regulation, which imposes stronger consent requirements for 
data collection, forces firms to delete personal data at a consumers request, 
and allows for fines up to 4% of a firms global revenue. 22 Hence, more 
muscular regulation does exist, and the political will for it is increasing. 
But in the United States, such regulation is the exception. 
The standard explanations for the inconsistency in measures of how 
people value privacy are bounded rationality and revealed preference.23  
Under bounded rationality, people are unaware of how much data they 
are emitting or they struggle to value privacy. The latter may be because 
privacy is abstract, or because privacy costs are inchoate and uncertain, 
both in scope and timing.24 Either way, people do not fully understand 
what is at stake. As a result, when deciding whether to exchange privacy 
for something more easily quantifiable, like money or convenience, small 
frictions may play an outsized role in decision-making.25 This line of 
scholarship draws on classic findings from psychology and economics, 
like the endowment effect and framing effects, to explain peoples fickle 
privacy preferences.26   
Under the revealed preference explanation, people give up privacy 
simply because this maximizes their utility.27 People trade privacy for 
money, or convenience, because this is what they actually prefer, 
regardless of what they say. If information has some cost, then consumers 
decision to avoid privacy information is itself an illustration of revealed 
preference.  
 
21 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(D) (2000). 
22 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of 
Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Advancement 
of Such Data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. L 119/1, Art. 83 § 5. 
23 See Svirsky, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that scholars point to bounded rationality or 
cognitive bias to explain inconsistency in privacy choices). 
24 See Acquisti, supra note 12, at 251-52 (stating that privacy violation costs are amorphous 
and difficult to assess even when quantifiable). 
25 See id., at 267 (explaining that data from one experimental design shows subjects were 
five times more likely to choose privacy when the trade-off to not doing so was framed as an 
opportunity to add to an initially gifted amount of money as opposed to retaining the entirety of 
the initially gifted amount).   
26 See id., at 252 (showing empirically that endowment effects and order preferences affect 
privacy valuations). 
27 See Athey, supra note 1, at 4 (“The second policy our results document is that there is a 
disconnect between stated privacy preferences and revealed preference, but that revealed 
preference is actually closest to the normative preference.”). 
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For either explanation – revealed preference or ignorance – more 
information is better. If its costless, people will always opt for better 
information about privacy settings. More recent research suggests a third 
explanation. 
B. Information Avoidance Can Explain this Inconsistency  
Recent research demonstrates that information avoidance can explain 
inconsistency in people’s privacy decisions.28  
There is a robust literature from psychology and economics on 
information avoidance.29 While economists typically model information as 
an intermediate good30 – i.e., valuable only because it helps us achieve ends 
– scholars in psychology and economics increasingly recognize that people 
sometimes behave as if information has emotional valence.31 This leads to 
a recognition that more information is not always better. 
This pattern of information-avoiding behavior is important across 
information-sharing domains. People will give money to a non-profit when 
a fundraiser goes door to door; many of the same people will find an excuse 
not to answer the door if they are warned ahead of time that a fundraiser is 
coming.32 In the health sector, one study found that 27% of intravenous drug 
users at risk of HIV who got tested for the disease did not return to the clinic 
to see their results,33 even though knowing ones HIV positive status can 
lengthen ones life. People avoid information that upsets them, even if in 
theory it should help them make a more optimal decision. 
Indeed, such behavior appears to be at play in privacy choices as well. 
Svirsky (2018) demonstrates that even people who value keeping data 
private at willingness-to-pay (“WTP”) prices of several dollars are willing 
to give up their data at nominal prices if they can avoid immediately seeing 
 
28 See Svirsky, supra note 3, at 24 (concluding that information avoidance may drive privacy 
decisions). 
29 See e.g., Golman, supra note 7, at 110 (summarizing the literature in economics and 
psychology related to regret aversion and optimism maintenance). 
30 See generally Posner, supra note 17 (analyzing the economics of information from an 
individual perspective to improve privacy analysis); George Stigler, The Economics of 
Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961) (modeling the ascertainment of market price in order 
to improve economic organization techniques). 
31 See Emily Oster et al., Optimal Expectations and Limited Medical Testing: Evidence from 
Huntington Disease, 103 AM. ECON. R. 804, 806 (2013) (analyzing the impact of an individual’s 
expectations in determining whether to undergo genetic testing). 
32 See DellaVigna et al., supra note 9, at 3 (finding that individuals who knew the exact time 
at which fundraising solicitors would arrive at their homes were more likely to not open the door 
to the solicitors). 
33 Patrick Sullivan et al., Failure to Return for HIV Test Results Among Persons at High 
Risk for HIV Infection, 35 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 511, 515 (2004). 
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the result of their decision.34 In the experiment, participants completed a 
survey after first deciding whether to do the survey anonymously (“high 
privacy”) or after giving their public Facebook profile data to the survey-
taker (“low privacy”) for a bonus.35 A control group chose between {0 cents, 
high privacy} and {50 cents, low privacy}.36 Roughly two thirds of 
participants opted for “high privacy”, and in follow-up treatments, most 
participants refused to opt for “low privacy” until offered at least $2.50.37  
In a treatment group, participants faced a choice between {0 cents, 
privacy option A} and {50 cents, privacy option B}.38 They knew that the 
two privacy options were randomized so that “privacy option A” could be 
“high” or “low” privacy with a 50% chance, and vice versa.39 Importantly, 
participants in the treatment group could click to reveal the privacy options 
before choosing, at no monetary cost.40 If they click a button, they know that 
they will then either see {0 cents, high privacy} and {50 cents, low privacy} 
as in the control group, or they will see a more obvious choice between {0 
cents, low privacy} and {50 cents, high privacy}.41  
The key finding was that hiding the potential privacy settings behind a 
veil – even when removing the veil is costless – causes a drop in people’s 
willingness to keep their data private.42 The percentage of people who 
refused 50 cents to stay anonymous dropped from 67% in the control group 
to 40% in the treatment group.43  
Importantly, this treatment effect that occurs for decisions between a 
money bonus or privacy does not replicate for decisions between two 
privacy settings, both associated with money bonuses (with the second 
money bonus drawn from the distribution of people’s willingness-to-pay 
prices for privacy).  When a second money bonus is hidden by a costless 
veil, participants do not evince the same willingness to engage in 
information avoidance. 
While the treatment effect is large and robust – it was documented across 
four experimental rounds across several months in a sample size of over 
1000 subjects44 – it leaves open important questions of what specific 
mechanism drives information avoidance behavior. 
 
34 Svirsky, supra note 3, at 24. 
35 Id., at 6. 
36 Id., at 9. 
37 Id., at 13. 




42 Id., at 21. 
43 Id., at 15. 
44 Id., at 11. 
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II. MULTIPLE MECHANISMS CAN EXPLAIN INFORMATION AVOIDANCE 
BEHAVIOR  
People engage in information avoidance when making privacy 
decisions.45 That is, they avoid looking at low-cost information about 
how their data will be shared, even when they value keeping their data 
private. But why? 
This section begins by modeling how a participant makes choices in 
the information avoidance experiment before then discussing competing 
mechanisms to explain the treatment effect and how the model can be 
extended to incorporate these mechanisms. 
A. Modeling the Wiggle Room Decision 
An agent is making a tradeoff between a payoff and an uncertain 
cost. For example, she might be deciding whether to download the Uber 
app, knowing that her data might be sold or her location tracked. 
Suppose the app brings some value 𝑣𝑣 and a privacy cost 𝑐𝑐 which occurs 
with probability 𝜋𝜋. Then, in a standard expected utility model, her utility 
is as follows: 
 
𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋) = 𝑣𝑣 − 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐 
 
Now suppose that there is a psychic cost to potentially losing 
privacy. The thought of something upsetting is itself upsetting. Let the 
function 𝜓𝜓() map 𝜋𝜋 onto disutility, with  
 
1. 𝜓𝜓(𝜋𝜋) > 0 ∀ 𝜋𝜋 ∈ [0,1] 
2. 𝜓𝜓′(𝜋𝜋) > 0 ∀ 𝜋𝜋 ∈ [0,1] 
 
The first condition says that the possibility of something upsetting is 
in itself upsetting. The second condition says that the agent gets more 
upset as the upsetting possibility becomes more likely -- a 100% chance 
of getting an electric shock upsets the agent more than a 10% chance. 
Throughout, I will assume that 𝜓𝜓(0) = 0. If 𝜓𝜓(𝜋𝜋) = 0 ∀ 𝜋𝜋 ∈ [0,1], we 
are in the case of classical preferences, where information is only 
valuable for instrumental reasons but has no valence in and of itself.  
The person’s utility function now incorporates psychic costs: 
 
𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋) = 𝑣𝑣 − 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐 − 𝜓𝜓(𝜋𝜋) 
 
45 Id., at 24. 
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In cases where a persons information is fixed – she has a belief about 
𝜋𝜋 but can do nothing to change this belief – psychic costs are akin to 
increasing the cost of a harm, albeit in a potentially non-linear way. The 
comparative statics are straightforward: more psychic costs means an 
individual is more likely to avoid an action. Where psychic costs will 
generate more interesting departures from standard models is in 
decisions over how much information to collect before making a 
decision.  
How does a participant make choices in the experimental design 
described above? Consider what happens when a participant gets what 
is commonly described as “wiggle room” – or the chance to make a 
choice where they give up their data without directly seeing that they 
are giving up their data. That is, they can choose a higher monetary 
payoff while still telling themselves that they might be keeping their 
data private. 
In the control group, the participant makes a direct tradeoff between 
money 𝑣𝑣 and the privacy cost 𝑐𝑐 and the psychic cost of losing privacy 
with near-certainty, 𝜓𝜓(𝜋𝜋𝐻𝐻), where 𝜋𝜋𝐻𝐻 is close to 1. She chooses to keep 
her privacy if the monetary payoff v is lower than the cost (psychic or 
otherwise) of losing privacy: 
 
𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋) = 𝑣𝑣 − 𝜋𝜋𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 − 𝜓𝜓(𝜋𝜋𝐻𝐻) < 0 
 
In the veiled tradeoff treatment, the participant first has to make a 
choice about whether to lift a veil, or whether to remain ignorant and 
take a higher payoff.  
Suppose the privacy options are randomized, so that if she lifts the 
veil, then with probability 𝑝𝑝 she will discover she is in the baseline 
condition (more money means less privacy), and with probability 1 − 𝑝𝑝 
she will discover she is in an easy situation where she can get more 
money and keep her privacy. If she remains ignorant, her payoff is: 
 
𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 − 𝜓𝜓(𝑝𝑝) 
 
In words, she gets the value v with certainty, but undergoes a privacy 
cost c with probability p and has a psychic cost 𝜓𝜓(𝑝𝑝). Consider a 
participant who would have opted for privacy in the control treatment, 
so the value of privacy is higher than the monetary payoff v. If she lifts 
the veil, then her expected payoff is: 
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𝑝𝑝(0) + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑣𝑣 = (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑣𝑣 
 
That is, with probability p she will face a tradeoff between privacy 
and money and will keep her privacy as before, yielding payoff 0; the 
rest of the time she will get a payoff without any privacy costs (psychic 
or instrumental). 
In a classical preferences world – one where people value 
information solely because it helps them make better choices, and where 
information has no attendant psychic costs –  𝜓𝜓(𝜋𝜋) = 0 ∀ 𝜋𝜋 ∈ [0,1], and 
any agent who chose privacy over money in the baseline treatment will 
always choose to lift the veil. Why? If, in baseline, she chose privacy 
over money, that means  
 
𝑣𝑣 − 𝜋𝜋𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 − 𝜓𝜓(𝜋𝜋𝐻𝐻) < 0 
𝑣𝑣 − 𝜋𝜋𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 < 0 
𝑣𝑣 < 𝜋𝜋𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 
𝑣𝑣 < 𝜋𝜋𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 < 1 ⋅ 𝑐𝑐 
𝑣𝑣 < 𝑐𝑐 
 
In the veiled tradeoff treatment, she lifts the veil if 
 
(1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑣𝑣 + 𝑝𝑝(0) > 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 − 𝜓𝜓(𝑝𝑝) 
𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣 > 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 
−𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣 > −𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 
𝑣𝑣 < 𝑐𝑐 
 
The last line is true by assumption. Putting the conclusion into plain 
language: if clicking to reveal the privacy settings is costless, then 
anyone who values privacy more than the money bonus would make it 
their business to see which privacy options they were agreeing to. The 
monetary bonus is simply not worth the risk of giving up data. 
In sum, the model demonstrates that the experimental result in 
Svirsky (2018) cannot be obtained from classic preferences, so long as 
the cost of clicking to reveal is minimal. The following subsections turn 
to different mechanisms that can explain the wiggle room result. 
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B. Mechanism: Thinking about Privacy Losses is Upsetting 
One explanation for the experimental results is from a model of anxiety 
in which people are upset by probabilistic harms.46 Importantly, the 
magnitude of the psychic harm need not be a linear function of the 
probability of the harm. Unlike in classic expected utility theory, when a 
100% chance of something good is exactly twice as nice as a 50% chance of 
the same reward, psychic costs can have different shapes.  
If someone has convex psychic costs – e.g., a 1%, or 2%, or 50% chance 
of harm are all treated like a 0% chance – then the wiggle room result can 
be obtained. 
Again, assume the agent chooses privacy over money in the baseline 
treatment. That means: 
 
𝑣𝑣 − 𝜋𝜋𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 − 𝜓𝜓(𝜋𝜋𝐻𝐻) < 0 
 
In the information avoidance treatment, she remains ignorant if: 
 
(1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑣𝑣 + 𝑝𝑝(0) > 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 − 𝜓𝜓(𝑝𝑝) 
−𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣 > −𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 − 𝜓𝜓(𝑝𝑝) 
𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 − 𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣 + 𝜓𝜓(𝑝𝑝) < 0 
𝑝𝑝(𝑐𝑐 − 𝑣𝑣) + 𝜓𝜓(𝑝𝑝) < 0 
𝑝𝑝(𝑣𝑣 − 𝑐𝑐) − 𝜓𝜓(𝑝𝑝) > 0 
 
Unlike before, an agent with psychic costs might opt for privacy in the 
direct tradeoff treatment, but choose to remain ignorant in the veiled tradeoff 
treatment.  
For this to happen, we need two conditions: 𝑣𝑣 > 𝑐𝑐 and a functional form 
for 𝜓𝜓(⋅) which is convex. This means that in the baseline case, psychic costs 
are what is driving the agent to opt for privacy. At the same time, her psychic 
costs are relatively low when losing privacy is uncertain: a 0.01% chance of 
losing privacy, or a 1%, or 10%, or 50% chance – all these feel distant from 
a 100% chance. Consider the classic Star Wars quote when an anxious C-
3PO warns the heroic Han Solo about the odds of successfully navigating 
an asteroid field.47 Solo shouts back: “never tell me the odds.”48 Here, Solo 
is like an agent with convex preferences over probabilistic harms. Whether 
 
46 See Botond Koszegi, Health Anxiety and Patient Behavior, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 1073, 
1074 (2003) (describing a model in which a patient’s utility function is defined by her 
expectations about her future physical outcomes). 
47 STAR WARS EPISODE V: THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (Lucasfilm Ltd. 1980). 
48 Id. 
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the probability of crashing is 0.01 or 0.99, he needs to ignore the danger and 
treat all probabilities as if they are zero. He wants to remain ignorant. 
C. Mechanism: Signaling 
Another explanation for the experimental result is signaling: people care 
about privacy, but they also care about seeming like they care about 
privacy.49  
This drives a wedge between the direct tradeoff group and the veiled 
tradeoff group, because members of the veiled tradeoff group can take the 
monetary bonus without explicitly sacrificing privacy. In the direct tradeoff 
group, taking the monetary payoff and rejecting privacy comes with a 
signaling cost of showing (either to herself or an observer) that the 
participant does not value privacy. In the veiled tradeoff group, meanwhile, 
taking the monetary payoff without looking at the privacy choices carries no 
such signaling cost. 
In the model, this would mean that the psychic cost of losing privacy 
depends on how observable her choice is. The monetary value v is the same 
across groups, but in the veiled tradeoff, if the cost of knowingly losing 
privacy is c, then the cost of losing privacy without being aware of doing so 
is c0 < c. Hence, some people who would choose to keep their privacy in the 
direct tradeoff treatment (c > v) would take the money and not click to reveal 
the privacy settings in the veiled tradeoff treatment (c > v > c0). If she gives 
up privacy without a (costless) veil, the psychic cost is imposed. If there is 
a veil, then the psychic cost is lower. 
D. Mechanism: Psychic Choosing Costs 
Some scholars posit that the act of making a choice imposes costs.50 The 
direct tradeoff group faces a direct choice between money and privacy, 
which may be difficult if privacy costs are inchoate or hard to measure. The 
veiled tradeoff group, meanwhile, can opt out of a difficult choice by 
refusing to consider it. The veil, then, creates a treatment effect by letting 
people avoid choosing costs.  
In the model, this works like signaling in reverse. People in the direct 
tradeoff group face a psychic cost of losing privacy (due to the difficulty of 
making the choice). If they give away their privacy, they lose cost c, but the 
 
49 Zachary Grossman & Joel J. van der Weele, Self-Image and Willful Ignorance in Social 
Decisions, 15 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 173, 176 (2017) (concluding that endogenous signaling 
is one driver of behavior in social situations). 
50 Cass Sunstein, Choosing Not to Choose, 64 DUKE L.J. 1, 40 (2014) (noting that active 
choice imposes a large burden on the chooser, unlike passive acceptance of a default). 
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act of choosing imposes a psychic calculation cost cchoose. People in the 
veiled tradeoff group, meanwhile, face no such cost unless they click to 
reveal the privacy settings. The result is that there exist participants who opt 
to remain anonymous in a control group setting but refuse to unveil – and 
then give up their privacy – in a treatment group setting. That is, c > v, so 
they choose privacy in the direct tradeoff treatment, but cchoose is large 
enough that it is not worth clicking to reveal the privacy settings and 
choosing to remain anonymous. 
E. Mechanism: All of the Above  
None of the explanations above are mutually exclusive. They may also 
be operative, to different degrees in different people. They may interact, so 
that cases with high choosing costs are also ones where signaling is more 
powerful. The interactions themselves may differ across people. Hence, the 
treatment effect might occur for one participant because she finds it 
unsavory to think about privacy losses, she has a hard time choosing, and 
she really only cares about seeming like she cares about privacy. For another 
participant, the treatment effect might hold because she actually does care 
about privacy but hates thinking about it, so she does not click to reveal in 
the veiled tradeoff treatment. A different participant might actually want to 
seem like she is not worried about privacy, but also has a hard time making 
tradeoffs between privacy and money, so the mechanisms would work in 
opposite directions.  
In short, while the existence of a treatment effect from the wiggle room 
experimental design has been demonstrated for privacy decisions, many 
mechanisms might be at play. The remainder of this paper turns to exploring 
these mechanisms with an additional experimental treatment. 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
304 participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk to take a 
short survey about health and financial status. All participants were 
informed that before doing the survey, they would make decisions about 
the size of a bonus payment, to be received upon completion, and the 
privacy settings of the survey.51 The experiment was conducted on January 
7, 2019. The sample of participants was limited to those in the United 
States.  
Research increasingly suggests that, for the purpose of social science 
experiments, Mechanical Turk users are a reliable sample. One might be 
 
51 The median wage in the study was $15.33 (based on a median payment of $1.02 for a 
median completion of 3:59 seconds). 
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concerned about how findings in this population translate to others. 
Because the setting is Mechanical Turk, one can assume that the sample is 
quite computer literate and also is comfortable completing short 
(mundane) tasks for a low wage. However, research suggests that these 
external validity issues are not of first-order importance. Irvine (2018) 
replicates three experiments using in-person labs, national online 
platforms, and Mechanical Turk, and finds that the results are constant 
across samples.52 Nonetheless, as with any experiment, the sample of 
participants is important to keep in mind when interpreting results.  
After recruitment, the timeline of the experiment consists of three 
stages: instructions, privacy settings, and a survey.53 First, participants 
were shown an initial introductory screen giving an overview of their 
participation. Participants were told that they would take a survey, but 
while everyone would take the same exact survey, each participant would 
be given a choice between two privacy options. They could opt for high 
privacy, in which case their survey answers would be anonymous. Or, they 
could opt instead for low privacy, in which case they would click a “Log 
in with Facebook” button at the top of the survey. This meant that the 
survey-taker would see, in addition to the participants survey answers, her 
public Facebook profile (including profile picture, name, and gender) and 
her email address. Participants who chose low privacy would not be 
allowed to finish the survey until they logged in.  
After the instructions stage, participants chose their privacy settings. 
After completing the privacy settings stage, participants completed the 
survey. 
The privacy measure in the experiment – whether to share Facebook 
information – has three advantages: it is a real decision, it is a realistic one, 
and it is an important one. First, participants who give up their privacy in 
this experiment must actually give over their profile data, so the choice is 
not a hypothetical one. Nor is it a behavior that can be faked; unlike other 
privacy experiments, which measure privacy as a persons willingness to 
answer an intrusive question, a participant in this experiment cannot 
pretend to give up privacy without actually giving anything up.54 Second, 
the decision is a realistic one. The “Log in with Facebook” button is a 
 
52 See Krin Irvine et al., Law and Psychology Grows Up, Goes Online, and Replicates, 15 
J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 320, 343-44 (2018) (demonstrating the key difference that Mechanical Turk 
users were significantly more attentive than other samples). 
53 For detailed study instructions, please email the author at dsvirsky@uber.com. 
54 Even if participants have a fake account they can use -- Facebook works hard to limit 
such behavior, but is not always successful -- handing over a fake account involves some cost. 
Doing so means the experimenter can link a fake Facebook account to a Mechanical Turk 
account (and the answers in the survey), which makes the fake account less effective. 
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ubiquitous part of the internet - many websites allow people to log in with 
their Facebook (or Google) account rather than with the website itself. 
Hence, it is a choice people routinely make: should I engage in online 
activity in a way that is linked to my Facebook profile or not? Third, the 
decision has important public policy implications, as suggested by the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal.55 
Each person was randomized into one of three treatments during the 
privacy settings stage: the direct tradeoff treatment, the veiled tradeoff 
treatment, and the choice tradeoff treatment. The exact format of the 
privacy choice made in each of the treatments can be seen in Figure 1 
(direct tradeoff), Figure 2 (veiled tradeoff), and Figure 3 (choice 
tradeoff).56  
Figure 1: In the direct tradeoff group, participants are aware that they are 
choosing between privacy and money, as both settings are visible by 
default. 
 
55 The privacy measure is less ecologically valid in the sense that it is about sharing data 
with a researcher, rather than a corporation or a government. It could be that people are more 
comfortable sharing data with an academic researcher than with Facebook or a police 
department. The opposite could also be true. In any case, this would cause all three experimental 
groups to change how they value privacy, but not impact them differentially. One interesting 
note is that in the Cambridge Analytica scandal, the malicious actors who harvested data posed 
as academic researchers. 
56 One contribution of this paper is replication. The first two groups – the direct and veiled 
tradeoff groups – face a decision identical to that in Svirsky, supra note 3. That paper finds a 
treatment effect of information avoidance. This paper expands on that paper by adding a third 
treatment group and is also an opportunity to replicate and retest the initial findings, which is 
vital for the health of scholarly disciplines that rely on sound experimental findings. See, e.g., 
Irvine et al., supra note 52. 
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Figure 2: In the veiled tradeoff group, participants choose between privacy 
and money. The privacy setting is hidden by default but can be revealed 
instantly and costlessly. 
 
Figure 3: In the choice tradeoff group, participants choose between 
privacy and money. The privacy setting is visible by default but can be 
hidden (and randomized) instantly and costlessly. 
  
In the direct tradeoff treatment, participants only made one decision: a 
direct choice between a 2-cent bonus and privacy option A or a 52-cent 
bonus and privacy option B. The privacy options were randomized so that 
half the time, participants faced a degenerate choice between { more 
money, more privacy } and { less money, less privacy }. The other half of 
the time, participants faced a true tradeoff between money and privacy. 
In the veiled tradeoff treatment, participants faced the same decision as 
in the direct tradeoff treatment, but the privacy setting was initially hidden. 
Participants had to click to reveal the column describing the privacy 
settings, and there was a 50% chance that the higher money bonus would 
mean losing their anonymity.57  
In the choice tradeoff treatment, participants faced the same layout as 
in the direct tradeoff treatment, but they had the option of clicking a button 
to hide (and randomize) the privacy settings. Upon clicking, the privacy 
 
57 Note that for both groups, there was a 50% chance of facing a degenerate choice between 
{ more money, more privacy } and { less money, less privacy }. These decisions cannot tell us 
about how much a person values privacy, so they are omitted from the main analyses below. 
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settings were hidden, and participants faced the same layout (and choice 
set) as the participants in the veiled tradeoff treatment. 
In sum, all participants faced the same choice, but depending on 
random assignment, they faced a different default layout. Some saw 
everything – money and privacy options – and had to choose directly. 
Some started off by seeing everything but through active choice could hide 
the privacy settings. Some started off with privacy settings hidden, and 
through active choice, could have revealed these settings. Hence, if 
clicking is costless, there should be no difference between the three 
groups. 
After completing the privacy stage, all participants completed a nine-
question survey, shown in Figure 4. Five questions covered demographics, 
health, and financial topics. These questions asked about the persons age, 
the number of times they exercise in a week, the number of times they 
have attempted to diet in their life, their annual income, and their credit 
card debt. The survey also included two questions to check 
comprehension. One asked “How old were you when you were 10 years 
old?” with a dropdown menu with several options, including 10. Another 
directly asked “How carefully did you make your choices?” with three 
options: “Not carefully at all”, “I thought about it a little”, and “I was very 
careful”. Two questions asked whether participants had a Facebook profile 
and how often they used Facebook. After submitting the survey, 
participants were finished. 
Figure 4: Screenshot of the survey that each participant completed. The 
“Log in With Facebook” button only appears if the participant opted to 
share her Facebook info. If she instead opted for anonymity, the button 
would not be included. 
 
42                 JOURNAL OF LAW & INNOVATION [Vol. 2: 23 
The demographic questions were selected somewhat arbitrarily, since 
they were not the focus of the experiment. The goal was to find questions 
that were somewhat intrusive (that implicate some privacy concerns) 
without being offensive. The comprehension and Facebook questions help 
to interpret any results. If a participant does not have a Facebook account, 
it is hard to interpret her privacy choices. Similarly, if the treatment effect 
is driven by people who fail comprehension questions, or who use 
Facebook rarely, then this is informative in understanding what drove any 
treatment effect.  
The user interface for the experiment was coded using HTML and 
Javascript, which ensured that the “reveal button” would work 
instantaneously -- without a page refresh. When a user clicked the reveal 
button, Javascript code changed the visibility setting of the hidden column 
from hidden to visible. The hidden column would therefore become visible 
immediately. The users choices and data were sent to a MySQL database 
using PHP code.58  
Even though the choice is essentially 50 cents vs privacy, it is more 
accurate to note that this is a 50-cent bonus. The participants are foregoing 
50 cents, not actually giving away any of their pre-experimental wealth. 
There is extensive behavioral economics literature noting the distinction 
between losses and gains.59 This point is broadly important but has little 
relevance here. Participants would be more likely to opt for money over 
privacy if the monetary change were a loss rather than a gain, but this 
would affect all three experimental groups equally. 
IV. RESULTS 
The results are organized as follows: Section A gives summary 
statistics and balance checks, while Section B shows the primary findings 
– the average treatment effects as compared to how often each group chose 
to remain anonymous, as well as how often the veiled and choice tradeoff 
groups clicked to hide or reveal the privacy settings. 
 
58 All code is available on request from the author and includes survey instructions, 
experimental module coding, and the raw data. Contact the author for the ZIP file: 
dsvirsky@hbs.edu. 
59 See, e.g., Botond Koszegi & Matthew Rabin, A Model of Reference-Dependent 
Preferences, 121 Q. J. OF ECON 1133, 1134 (2006) (expounding on prospect theory as applied 
to consumer behavior). 
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A. Summary Statistics 
There were no systematic demographic differences between the 
treatment groups, as expected given the random assignment. Of note, 
90% of participants reported having a Facebook account, and the median 
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Table 1: Summary statistics. Standard deviation reported in parenthesis. 
With the exception of age, which is reported in years, each variable is 
categorical. Hence, an answer of 1 for credit card debt corresponds to a 
range of $1000 to $2000 in debt. 
B. Main Results: Average Treatment Effects 
Do either of the two treatments lead people to choose privacy more 
often? When given the option to hide or reveal information, do 
participants do so? 
In all three treatments, participants faced the same choice: participants 
were offered 52 cents to share their Facebook data, or 2 cents to preserve 
their anonymity. The only difference was in the default information 
presented. Nonetheless, I find a significant impact on people’s 
44                 JOURNAL OF LAW & INNOVATION [Vol. 2: 23 
willingness to sell their data. Roughly 70% of people in the direct tradeoff 
group opted to remain anonymous. In the veiled tradeoff group, only 40% 
remained anonymous. These numbers are almost identical to those found 
in Svirsky (2018).60 Meanwhile, however, participants in the choice 
tradeoff group – who saw both money and privacy settings but had the 
choice to hide the privacy settings – were halfway between the other 
groups. Roughly 56% of participants in the choice tradeoff group opted 
to remain anonymous: less than in the direct tradeoff group, but more than 
in the veiled tradeoff group. Figure 5 presents the results graphically. 
Table 1 shows the results of regression models where {ended up staying 
private} is the binary dependent variable, and there are indicator variables 
for the veiled and choice tradeoff groups. Each column presents a 
different sample, each one representing a robustness check. 
 
Figure 5: This figure shows the proportion of participants who ended up 
remaining anonymous for 2 cents instead of sharing their Facebook 
profile for 52 cents, for the direct tradeoff group (N = 108), the veiled  
 
60 See Svirsky, supra note 3, at 1 (finding that online survey participants had to make the 
same choice whether to share their Facebook profile data with the survey taker in exchange for 
a higher payoff).  
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tradeoff group (N = 109), and the choice tradeoff group (N = 87). These 
results exclude all participants who, by randomization, faced a degenerate 
tradeoff of 52 cents and high privacy vs 2 cents and low privacy. 
Therefore, for the veiled tradeoff group, anyone who chose the higher 
money option is counted as having chosen 50 cents over anonymity, 
regardless of whether they clicked to reveal the privacy setting before 













































N 304 264 294 272 
Adjusted 
R2 
0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 
Table 2: Regression models of average treatment effect. The dependent 
variable is a binary variable for whether the person ended up remaining 
anonymous. There are indicator variables for the veiled and choice 
tradeoff groups, so the constant represents the proportion of participants 
in the direct tradeoff group who ended up remaining anonymous. Each 
column uses a different subset of the sample in order to provide 
robustness checks. *** p < 0.001, * < 0.10. 
 
Participants in the choice tradeoff group by and large did not hide 
information about privacy. In the choice tradeoff group, only 9% of 
participants made an active choice to hide (and randomize) the privacy 
settings before making a choice. In the veiled tradeoff group, where 
privacy settings were hidden by default (but could be revealed), 45% of 
participants made a choice without seeing the privacy information. This 
difference in proportions is statistically significant (Fisher’s Exact p < 
0.001). 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper explores why people avoid information about privacy when 
making data sharing decisions. Existing work demonstrates that even 
when privacy settings are easy to read – even just two words long – people 
who otherwise would pay several dollars to remain anonymous are happy 
to avoid looking at the settings and take a 50-cent bonus. This paper 
solidifies this behavior. It finds that while people are happy to avoid 
information that is already hidden, they are not likely to actively hide 
information that is in front of them to begin with. At the same time, the 
option of hiding information makes people marginally more likely to sell 
their data, even if they do not choose to hide the privacy settings.  
The results give more support to certain mechanisms of information 
avoidance than others. Theories that rely on signaling are consistent with 
the data presented here. If people care more about seeming like they value 
privacy, then they might take the money if given plausible deniability (as 
in the veiled tradeoff group), but not go so far as to actively hide 
information (as in the choice tradeoff group), as such a choice would signal 
a willingness to care little about privacy.  
Theories that posit that people simply prefer not to think about privacy, 
or prefer not to choose, are less consistent with the data. If these 
mechanisms explain information avoidance, then people would opt to 
simplify their choice if given the option. 
The results also suggest that current U.S. privacy law – centered around 
giving consumers better information – may be difficult to achieve in 
practice. There is considerable scholarship and policy experimentation 
around giving people simpler, more effective disclosures.61 Simpler 
disclosures is likely a good thing: if it gives people more information at 
lower costs, this should improve welfare. At the same time, if many people 
choose to avoid information about privacy, then better disclosures will not 
be as effective as a classical economics model would suggest. If societies 
want people to end up with more privacy, it will be difficult to do so by 




61 See, e.g., Chilton & Ben-Shahar, supra note 12, at 1 (describing the failure of simplified 
privacy disclosures to effect meaningful change in participants’ behavior in disclosing private 
information); Corey Ciocchetti, The Future of Privacy Policies: A Privacy Nutrition Label Filled 
with Fair Information Practices, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMP. & INFO. L. 1 (2008-2009) 
(discussing standardization of labels to force all e-commerce homepages to conspicuously post 
their privacy practices). 
